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Note
Manufacturers' Liability
For Design Defects
Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Melia v. Ford Motor Co.,' the Court. of Appeals for the
Eighth -Circuit was called upon for the third time 2 in less than
one year to interpret and apply the Nebraska version of strict liabil-
ity in tort as it relates to alleged design defects. The difficulty
of its task was magnified by the fact that the Nebraska Supreme
Court has not allowed recovery under strict liability principles in
any appeal it has heard since its initial endorsement of section 402A
of the Second Restatement of Torts,3 in Kohler v. Ford Motor Co. 4
Melia involved a wrongful death action arising out of a right-
angle, two car collision in an Omaha intersection. The plaintiff
sued the driver of the colliding vehicle in state court.5 A jury
denied the plaintiff recovery, presumably finding that the plain-
tiff's decedent had entered the intersection against a red light and
was thus contributorily negligent.6 The plaintiff then brought an
action in federal court seeking recovery from Ford Motor Company
on the theory that the decedent's injuries were enhanced by the
defective design of a door latch mechanism. The plaintiff received
a jury verdict for $55,000 based upon a strict tort liability theory.
The district court overruled the defendant's motions for a new trial
or in the alternative for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. On
appeal, a divided Eighth Circuit panel affirmed the action of the
trial court. Judge Lay wrote the majority opinion with which
1. 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976).
2. The two prior cases were Riha v. Jasper Blackburn Corp., 516 F.2d
840 (8th Cir. 1975), and Sherrill v. Royal Indus., Inc., 526 F.2d 507
(8th Cir. 1975).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter referred
to as section 402A in the text].
4. 187 Neb. 428, 191 N.W.2d 601 (1971). The court's decision was far from
unanimous, with three of the seven justices filing dissenting opinions.
All dissenting opinions were concerned with the issue of legal causa-
tion.
5. Melia v. Svoboda, 191 Neb. 150, 214 N.W.2d 476 (1974).
6. Id. at 152, 214 N.W.2d at 477.
DESIGN DEFECTS
Judge Henley concurred. Judge Bright filed a detailed, and com-
pelling dissent. The ultimate issue concerned the criteria to be
applied in a strict liability action to determine whether or not
the design of a product is such that it should be considered
"defective."
This note will demonstrate that the majority misconstrued prior
decisions of both the Nebraska Supreme Court and the Eighth Cir-
cuit, and failed to enunciate a useful standard for design defect
cases. Moreover, recovery was allowed for what was found to be
an enhanced injury when in fact the plaintiff introduced no evi-
dence whatsoever from which the jury could properly infer that
the decedent's injuries would have been any less if the alleged de-
fect had not existed.
II. PRIOR NEBRASKA LAW
Strict liability in tort for products other than food items first
was recognized in Nebraska in Kohler v. Ford Motor Co.7 There,
the plaintiff sustained serious personal injuries when her car left the
highway and overturned, apparently because a tooth on the stear-
ing gear broke. Citing the landmark decisions of Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,8 a case with strikingly similar facts, and
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,9 the Nebraska Supreme
Court entered the era of strict products liability: "We hold that
a manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he placed
in the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for
defects, proves to have a defect which causes an injury to a human
being rightfully using that product."'10 The court listed, and
apparently approved, the trial court's jury instructions which
included a requirement that "[t] he defect, if it existed, made the
automobile unreasonably dangerous and unsafe for its intended
use."" Thus, from the beginning, the "unreasonably dangerous"
requirement was an integral part of the plaintiff's burden of proof
in Nebraska.
The Nebraska Supreme Court next commented on strict liability
in Hawkins Construction Co. v. Matthews Co. 1 2 The issue there
involved the propriety of recovery for purely economic losses,
absent any personal injuries, under strict liability. The court de-
7. 187 Neb. 428, 191 N.W.2d 601 (1971).
8. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
9. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
10. 187 Neb. at 436, 191 N.W.2d at 606.
11. Id. at 436, 191 N.W.2d at 607.
12. 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973).
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cided that the policy considerations behind a manufacturer's liabil-
ity to consumers did not necessarily carry over into the commercial
area:
If the loss is merely economic, the Uniform Commercial Code has
given the purchaser an ample recourse under the particular pro-
visions and requirements of the code. Placed broadly, it is the law
of sales, and not the law of torts, which protects the buyer's inter-
est in the benefit of his bargain.13
If Hawkins had said no more than this, it would have little appli-
cation to Melia which was a personal injury action. However, the
trial court in Hawkins had submitted the case to the jury with in-
structions which completely intermingled warranty and strict
liability concepts. At first glance, this would seem to require a
new trial. Yet the court salvaged the jury's verdict through sound
legal logic and in the process cast light on the issue of proof of
defectiveness in a products liability action:
As we have already pointed out, the issue that the product was
defective, that the defect existed at the time the product left the
manufacturer's control, that the product reached the consumer sub-
stantially unchanged, and was the proximate cause of the damage,
were issues all resolved against the defendants by the jury and we
will not disturb them. These issues are, in substance, identical
issues that are necessary to prove under the strict tort theory.14
In addition, the court commented on defenses available in strict
liability.
It is clear that traditional "contributory negligence" in the sense
of a failure to discover a defect or to guard against it, is not a de-
fense to a suit in strict tort, or for a breach of warranty. Assump-
tion of risk and misuse of the product are. Restatement, Torts 2d,
§ 402A, Comment n, p. 356.15
Thus, while denying recovery under strict liability in tort
principles, the court augmented its prior adoption of section 402A
by narrowing the defense of contributory negligence to those cate-
gories known as assumption of risk and misuse of product. It also
stated the criteria for determining defectiveness as essentially the
same under either warranty or tort causes of action.
The third Nebraska case involving strict liability, Friedrich v.
Anderson,'6 was recognized by both the majority and the dissent
in Melia as controlling. In Friedrich, the Nebraska Supreme Court
joined those jurisdictions that followed the Eighth Circuit's leading
13. Id. at 562, 209 N.W.2d at 653.
14. Id. at 566, 209 N.W.2d at 655 (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 567, 209 N.W.2d at 655.
16. 191 Neb. 724, 217 N.W.2d 831 (1974).
DESIGN DEFECTS
decision of Larsen v. General Motors Corp.17 The Nebraska court
held that car manufacturers must anticipate that their products
will be involved in collisions and therefore they can be held liable
for injuries resulting from a defect in the product which, though
it did not cause the accident, increased the injury resulting from
it. Thus the court held that a cause of action would exist for the
"second impact" or "enchanced injury" liability. However, while
holding that Nebraska would follow Larsen, the court in Friedrich
sustained a summary judgment for the defendant Chrysler, holding
that as a matter of law, the design of the shift lever which injured
the plaintiff's eye as the result of the collision, did not create "a
foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm."1 8  The court held
that:
NJI No. 11.03 contains what seems to be a comprehensive and
accurate statement of the law applicable to this situation and is in
accord with what we think to be the better reasoned rule relating
to "second impact" or enhanced injuries.- We therefore hold that a
manufacturer of goods has a duty to use reasonable care in the de-
sign of goods to protect those who will use the goods from un-
reasonable risk of harm while the goods are being used for their
intended purpose or any purpose which could be reasonably ex-
pected.")
The court applied the above test to the summary judgment
motion and held that:
All the evidence relating to the claimed duty of the defendants
to the plaintiff in the design of the gearshift lever knob is before
the court and is undisputed, and in our opinion is not sufficient that
reasonable minds could properly find that the defectively designed
product created a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm. In
other words, there was no substantial competent evidence from
which one reasonably could draw an inference of negligence on the
part of defendants proximately causing plaintiff's injuries. Ac-
cordingly, the action of the trial court in granting summary judg-
ment was correct and is affirmed.20
The significance of this statement lies in the fact that although
the plaintiff in Friedrich sought to recover under theories of negli-
gence, strict liability, and implied warranty, the Nebraska Supreme
Court spoke entirely in terms of what are traditionally considered
negligence concepts and standards. While other commentators
have reached different conclusions, 21 the case seems to hold that,
17. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
18. 191 Neb. at 733, 217 N.W.2d at 836.
19. Id. at 731-32, 217 N.W.2d at 836.
20. Id. at 732-33, 217 N.W.2d at 836-37.
21. See Note, Second Impact Liability in Nebraska, 54 NEB. L. REV. 172,
179 (1975); Casenote, 8 CREiGHTox L. REV. 233, 242 (1974).
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at least in Nebraska, the criteria for determining liability in a case
involving product design is the same under all three theories. This
view provides a firm foundation for the dissent in Melia that, as
a matter of law, the design of the car door was not "defective."
This conclusion is supported by the fourth, and most recent,
Nebraska Supreme Court case dealing with strict liability. Mc-
Daniel v. McNeil Laboratories,22 was decided after Melia and thus,
was not available for consideration by the Eighth Circuit. Nonethe-
less, the holding of the case is germane to this discussion. The
plaintiff in McDaniel was injured as a result of the anesthetic she
received during an operation. The jury returned a verdict in favor
of the defendant and the plaintiff appealed, alleging that the trial
court erred in submitting the case to the jury only upon the theory
of negligence and eliminating the theories of express and implied
warranties and strict liability. In sustaining the trial court's action,
the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed comments 23 to section 402A
and held:
22. 196 Neb. 190, 241 N.W.2d 822 (1976).
In McDaniel, the plaintiff sued five defendants, although only the
issue of the liability of the manufacturer went to the jury.
23. Portions of several comments to section 402A are appropriate
and pertinent here.
Comment i, page 352, provides in part: "The rule stated
in this Section applies only where the defective condition of
the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer. * * * The article sold must be dangerous to an ex-
tent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordi-
nary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge
common to the community as to its characteristics."
Comment k, page 353, to section 402A, is peculiarly appro-
priate and directly applicable here .. .. "The seller of such
[unavoidably unsafe] products, again with the qualification
that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper
warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be
held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending
their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the
public with an apparently useful and desirable product, at-
tended with a known but apparently reasonable risk."
In essence, it might be said that plaintiffs contend that
a fixed ratio combination of two drugs is improper drug design
and is therefore unreasonably dangerous.
Innovar was approved by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion on January 31, 1968. ...
While approval by the Food and Drug Administration is
not necessarily conclusive, its determinations, based upon the
opinions and judgment of its own experts, should not be sub-ject to challenge in a product liability case simply because
DESIGN DEFECTS
In this case there is no essential conflict as to the facts and the
evidence. There is a difference of opinion among expert witnesses
as to whether those facts establish that Innovar is or is not a defec-
tive and unreasonably dangerous drug. . . . An unavoidably un-
safe drug which has been approved for marketing by the United
States Food and Drug Administration, properly prepared, com-
pounded, packaged, and distributed, and accompanied by proper
approved directions and warnings, as a matter of law, is not de-
fective nor unreasonably dangerous, in the absence of proof of inac-
curate, incomplete, misleading, or fraudulent information furnished
by the manufacturer in connection with such federal approval or
later revisions thereof.24
This is consistent with the holding in Friedrich. After setting
forth the duty of an auto manufacturer in the design of his product,
the Friedrich court added this caveat:
However, an automobile manufacturer is not an insurer that its
product is, from a design viewpoint, incapable of producing injury.
Furthermore, in the application of the general rule, whenever a
"second impact" or enhanced injury occurs, this should not be an
open invitation to a jury to speculate as to the issue of foreseeabil-
ity or the unreasonableness of the risk of harm. This is no differ-
ent than in any other tort case in which there is always the pre-
liminary question of law for the court "not whether there is
literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury
can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it,
upon whom the burden of proof is imposed."'25
Thus the Nebraska Supreme Court in McNeil, as in Friedrich,
held that before the issue of strict liability is submitted to the jury,
the trial judge, when called upon by a motion for a directed verdict,
must determine whether as a matter of law the product in question
is reasonably safe and thus not defective.
The majority's opinion in Melia recognized this requirement and
attempted to address it, holding that "[a] n analysis of the record
here reveals sufficient evidence of unsafe design creating a foresee-
able and unreasonable risk of harm. '2
6
The analysis of the majority2 7 may seem persuasive until one
reads Judge Bright's dissent:
some other experts may differ in their opinions as to whether
a particular drug is reasonably safe ....
Id. at 197-200, 241 N.W.2d at 826-28.
24. Id. at 200-01, 241 N.W.2d at 828 (emphasis added).
25. 191 Neb. at 732, 217 N.W.2d at 836 (citation omitted).
26. 534 F.2d at 798.
27. Two well qualified professional engineers testified for the
plaintiff that the door latch deviated from safety engineering
practice and was not protected from horizontal external forces
which could release the latch. In their opinion the collision to
the car had only a "brushing" horizontal effect on the door and
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The majority opinion leaves an impression that this accident
resulted from a slight impact. That is not the case. Plaintiff's ex-
perts were clear that the fairly modest glancing impact on the Mus-
tang door was followed within "milliseconds" by a very severe
blow to the rigid quarter pillar and rear wheel. The speed, angle,
sequence, and timing of the two impacts had to properly coincide
to open the door in the manner alleged by plaintiff....
However, neither of plaintiff's experts was able to express any
opinion of the likelihood that an automobile would be exposed to
the concurrence of all of the facts necessary to activate the latch
and open the door.28
After discussing and citing extensively from Friedrich, Judge
Bright concluded:
The plaintiff's case showed that any unlocked door latch on the
modern automobile can open, given the appropriate application of
forces in a collision, and uncontradicted evidence showed that
the Mustang latch was less dangerous in actual collisions than any
other latch then being manufactured....
the latch had no "fail-safe" mechanism to prevent the car door
from flying open.
Mr. Egerer, one of the plaintiff's engineers, testified that
the door latch was designed in such a manner that it would
open upon very slight impact. Using visual exhibits, he
showed the trial court and the jury the door latches used on
the 1968 Lincoln, Ambassador, Plymouth and Chevrolet. Each
of these latches in his opinion contained a fail-safe mechan-
ism, unlike the 1968 Mustang. Both Mr. Egerer and Mr. Klein,
plaintiff's other expert, testified that the design involved did
not conform to accepted engineering standards.
Defendant's argument is that the defect did not, as a mat-
ter of law, create a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm.
We cannot agree. . . . For this court to rule that a jury could
not find an unreasonable risk of harm from a car door opening
upon slight impact, would require us to ignore the record as
well as common experience.
Id. at 798-99 (footnotes omitted).
28. Id. at 802-03 (footnotes omitted). The dissent continued:
The only information of which they were aware was a crash
study conducted in 1969 by Cornell University. That study
showed that of all major American makes of automobiles,
Ford's equipped with the very latch used on decedent's Mus-
tang had the lowest rate of doors opening during collisions.
Plaintiff's experts had compiled an exhibit of other types of
American automotive door latches which they used by way
of contrast to illustrate the "design defect" in the Mustang
latch. Interestingly enough these were the precise latches to
which the Mustang latch was compared in the Cornell study.
The plaintiffs experts conceded that each of these other
latches could open upon impact-in other words, would not
"fail safe" upon impact in certain circumstances dissimilar to
those in the present case.
Id. at 803-04.
DESIGN DEFECTS
On the basis of this Nebraska rule of law, [Friedrich] we should
reject the jury verdict in the present case.29
The dissent argued that the car in question, was reasonably safe
as a matter of law.
The plaintiff's expert did assert that a slightly different design
would have averted this particular accident. But Judge Traynor,
the author of the Greenman decision, has recognized that such an
ex post facto determination begs the question, for it is hard to
conceive of an accident that could not have been avoided by a
slightly different design.30 Here, however, the plaintiff produced
no statistical evidence of the likelihood of occurrence of the peculiar
sequence of events which led to the door opening. Indeed, if the
repositioning of the pivot point advocated by the plaintiff's expert
had been carried out, the door mechanism might not have been any
safer overall. It is widely recognized that something as complex
as the design of a door-locking mechanism is the product of numer-
ous conscience engineering decisions.3 1 Each part is integrated into
the whole system and the alteration of a single element could have
a disasterous result on the performance of the product as a whole.
III. PRIOR EIGHTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
The Melia decision not only diverged from Nebraska law, but
from past Eighth Circuit decisions as well. This is most apparent
when Melia is compared to Larsen v. General Motors Corp.,32 a
negligence action which applied Minnesota law. The court in Lar-
sen said:
We do agree that under the present state of the art an automo-
bile manufacturer is under no duty to design an accident-proof or
fool-proof vehicle or even one that floats on water, but such manu-
facturer is under a duty to use reasonable care in the design of its
vehicle to avoid subjecting the user to an unreasonable risk of in-
jury in the event of a collision. Collisions with or without fault
of the user are clearly foreseeable by the manufacturer and are
statistically inevitable.
29. Id. at 804-05 (footnotes omitted).
30. See Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict
Liability, 32 TENN. L. Rv. 363, 372 (1965).
31. See Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 CoTJm. L. Rav. 1531 (1973).
This article contains a very thorough analysis of the difficulties inher-
ent in evaluating complex design alternatives in an adversarial pro-
ceeding. Professor Henderson concludes that the area is one that is
best governed by either traditional negligence or legislatively imposed
standards.
32. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
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We, therefore, do not think the automotive industry is being
singled out for any special adverse treatment by applying to it gen-
eral negligence principles in 1) imposing a duty on the manu-
facturer to use reasonable care in the design of its products to pro-
tect against an unreasonable risk of injury or enhancement of
injury to a user of the product, and 2) holding that the intended
use of an automotive product contemplates its travel on crowded
and high speed roads and highways that inevitably subject it to
the foreseeable hazards of collisions and impacts. 33
To construe Larsen properly it is necessary to read it in light
of Schneider v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,34 another auto design defect
case decided by the Eighth Circuit only seven months after Larsen
and applying Nebraska rather than Minnesota law. In Schneider,
the plaintiff sought to recover for lacerations he received from a
microscopic cutting edge on his car's vent window. The trial court
entered judgment for the defendant notwithstanding a jury verdict
for the plaintiff, and the plaintiff appealed. He had sought recov-
ery under negligence and implied warranty theories. On appeal,
he also urged the adoption of strict liability under section 402A.
The appellate court sustained the defendant's verdict on the negli-
gence issue on the ground that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff
had not shown an unreasonable risk of injury as defined in Larsen.
In a footnote, the court commented that the "range and type of
accidents that can and will occur are pragmatically infinite but even
on hindsight this unfortunate accident is not reasonably foresee-
able. '35 The more interesting portion of the decision involves the
disposition of the implied warranty and strict liability claims. The
court cited a well-known treatise for the proposition that
... by and large, the standard of safety of goods is the same
under the warranty theory as under the negligence theory. In both
actions the plaintiff must show (1) that the goods were unreason-
ably dangerous * * * for the use to which they would ordinarily
be put * * *.36
The court then affirmed the trial court's judgment on the implied
warranty claim, agreeing that as a matter of law the vent window
was not unreasonably dangerous. It must be inferred that the
court considered the issue of unreasonable danger, and hence defec-
tiveness, to be the same under implied warranty and strict liability
theories. If there was any doubt as to the issue at that time, the
33. Id. at 502-04.
34. 401 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1968).
35. Id. at 557 n.10.
36. Id. at 558 (citing 2 HAuPFa & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 28.22, at
1584 (1956)).
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Nebraska Supreme Court has explicitly so held in Hawkins Con-
struction Co. v. Matthews Co.31
IV. DESIGN DEFECTS
It is clear that at the time of the adoption of "second impact"
liability in Larsen, the legal criteria for determining whether a
product was unreasonably dangerous and therefore defective were
the same under theories of negligence, implied warranty and strict
liability. It was this theory of liability for enhanced injuries that
the Nebraska Supreme Court, relying on Larsen, adopted in
Friedrich, and it was this concept of defectiveness that the Eighth
Circuit was bound to apply in Melia. Thus in Nebraska there was
only one cause of action for defective design, though it had three
different names. Whether a petition is one for breach of an implied
warranty, negligent design, or strict liability for defective design
does not matter. The criteria for evaluating the product are the
same for all three: is there "substantial competent evidence from
which one reasonably could draw an inference of negligence on the
part of defendants proximately causing plaintiff's injuries[?]"38
The majority's opinion can be read as evidencing an awareness
of this standard. Indeed, in its first footnote it quoted at length
from Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.39 Yet, if the majority
were satisfied with the Fourth Circuit's analysis of Larsen, it is
curious that it ignored this analysis in Melia. The issue in
Dreisonstok was the propriety of a verdict for the plaintiffs in an
action before the district court judge without a jury. The appellate
37. 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973).
38. Friedrich v. Anderson, 191 Neb. at 733, 217 N.W.2d at 836-37.
39. 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974).
The key phrase in the statement of the Larsen rule is
"unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision", not
foreseeability of collision. The latter circumstances is as-
sumed in collision cases under the Larsen principle; it is the
element of "unreasonable risk" that is uncertain in such cases
and on which the determination of liability or no liability will
rest. It would patently be unreasonable "to require the man-
ufacturer to provide for every conceivable use or unuse of a
car." Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial
Process, 55 Cal. L. Rev. 645, 646. Liability for negligent de-
sign thus "is imposed only when an unreasonable danger is
created. Whether or not this has occurred should be deter-
mined by general negligence principles, which involve a bal-
ancing of the likelihood of harm, and the gravity of harm if
it happens against the burden of the precautions which would
be effective to avoid the harm." In short, against the likeli-
hood and gravity of harm '"must be balanced in every case
the utility of the type of conduct in question."
534 F.2d at 797-98 n.1 (quoting Dreisonstok, 489 F.2d at 1071).
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court reversed and remanded with direction to enter verdict for
the defendant. The plaintiff's experts had established the pur-
ported defect by comparing the microbus, involved in the collision
which produced the plaintiff's injuries, with a 1966 Ford passenger
car. The reviewing court held that a comparison between such
radically different vehicles was an inappropriate standard for de-
termining reasonableness of the design. The court then held that
from the evidence, the defendant was entitled to a verdict as a
matter of law.40 Thus Dreisonstok really was support for the
dissent's, and not the majority's, position.
The other case cited by the majority warrants discussion on the
issue of defectiveness with respect to design cases. Hoppe v. Mid-
west Conveyor Co., Inc.,41 involved the design of a conveyor-hoist
which had injured a factory worker. In reversing a directed
verdict for the defendant, the Eighth Circuit, in an opinion by
Judge Lay concluded that, under Missouri law, there was no dif-
ference between negligent design and strict liability. It is interest-
ing to note that the appellate court directed that on remand the
district court should admit evidence from plaintiff's expert that had
been excluded in the first trial:
40. It, perhaps, may not be amiss to note that there is not sub-
stantial evidence to sustain a finding that as a result of the de-
sign of the microbus the plaintiff's injuries were enhanced.
Cf., Yetter v. Rajeski, supra, at pp. 108-109 (364 F. Supp.). In
fact, the record seems clear that in any event the plaintiff,
who had made no endeavor to protect herself with a seat belt,
would have received severe injuries, irrespective of the type
of vehicle she may have been riding in. There was testimony
-which was not seriously questioned-that experiments con-
ducted under the auspices of the Department of Transporta-
tion indicated that "the average barrier equipment velocity for
fatalities, the mean velocity is only 33 miles per hour * * *."
It may be that in every case the injuries may be somewhat
different but any "head-on" collision at a speed of 40 miles
an hour or more will result in severe injuries to the occupants
of a vehicle and, certainly in 1968, no design short of an im-
practical and exorbitantly expensive tank-like vehicle (see,
Alexander v. Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company, supra, 346
F. Supp. 320) could have protected against such injuries; in
fact, it is doubtful that even such a vehicle could have. Can
it be said that a manufacturer in 1968 must have, in its design,
so built its vehicle as to protect against such an "unreasonable
risk of injury"? We think not.
487 F.2d at 1076.
41. 485 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1973). Unlike the Eighth Circuit, many other
commentators and courts have distinguished between manufacturing
and design defects. See, e.g., Volkswagen v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321
A.2d 737 (Ct. App. 1974); Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning
of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV. 339 (1974); Powell & Hill, Pro-of of Defect
or Defectiveness, 5 U. BALT. L. REV. 77 (1975).
DESIGN DEFECTS
We think the court erred and was unduly restrictive in ruling
on the admissibility of Dr. Dreifke's testimony on this subject
matter .... Liability alleged from defective design encompasses
many factors not generally relevant to ordinary negligence in tort
cases. The comparative design with similar and competitive ma-
chinery in the field, alternate designs and post accident modifica-
tion of the machine, the frequency or infrequency of use of the same
product with or without mishap, and the relative cost and feasibil-
ity in adopting other design are all relevant to proof of defective
design.42
It is precisely these elements that were missing from the plaintiff's
evidence in Melia. The majority opinion cited no evidence of either
the existence or the frequency of similar accidents involving car
doors that pop open. Nor was there testimony from the plain-
tiff's experts as to the statistical likelihood of the unique series
of events required to cause the door to pop open. Finally there
was no evidence that the alternative design proposed was feasible
in the sense that it was safer overall.
This complete absence of proof on the critical issues observed
in light of the Nebraska Supreme Court's prior holdings, leads to
the conclusion that the car in question was, as a matter of law,
reasonably safe.
V. DRIVER'S CONDUCT
Even assuming that the question of the reasonableness of the
danger presented was a proper question for the jury, the majority
decision refused to allow the jury all of the information needed
to determine the magnitude of the risk. The trial judge refused
to admit evidence that the decedent had entered the intersection
on a red light and may have been speeding. The majority dismissed
this as irrelevant, yet the fact that the decedent entered the inter-
section illegally had a direct bearing on the statistical likelihood
of the occurrence of the accident and thus the reasonableness and
foreseeability of the danger.
The majority also found that "[t] he record shows no foundation
for the admission of the speed of decedent's autombile. '43 It thus
upheld the district court's refusal to admit the defendant's evidence
on the issue. Although this may have been proper from an eviden-
tiary point of view, it ignored the fact that the speed of the
decedent's automobile was an essential element of the plaintiff's
proof. It was conceded by plaintiff's experts that had the dece-
dent's car been stationary in the intersection when hit by the
42. 485 F.2d at 1202 (footnotes omitted).
43. 634 F.2d at 800.
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defendant's car, the door latch would not have come open.44 With-
out knowing the speed of the decedent's car, it was impossible for
any of the expert witnesses to estimate the mechanical forces neces-
sary to cause the latch to fail4 5 and more important, none could
testify as to the general statistical likelihood of the concurrence
of events necessary to produce this particular accident. The ab-
sence of any proof by the plaintiff on this crucial element of her
case 46 alone should have justified a directed verdict for the defend-
ant.
44. The plaintiff's expert, Mr. Egerer, when discussing the angle of the
vehicles and their speed, testified that "if it had been a 90-degree col-
lision, the door could not have opened because the force and the ob-
stacle would have been in front of it, and although the jaws may have
opened in the latch mechanism, the door could not have opened."
Transcript, vol. 1, at 170, Melia v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV 73-0-121
(D. Neb. 1975). He later conceded that with different accidents, dif-
ferent collisions, or different configurations, that different results with
the same latches~would occur. Id. vol. 1, at 225.
45. Plaintiff's accident-reconstruction expert, Mr. Klein, in response to the
question, "[dJo you know what the rate of peneration of that Volk-
wagen automobile was into the side of this door?" replied:
No, I have no way of knowing.
There is no way of telling because we don't know which
vehicle absorbed specific amounts of energy because both ve-
hicles absorbed some of the kinetic energy of impact, so from
looking at the vehicles you have no way of knowing, other
than measurements of the final deformations.
Id. vol. 1, at 328.
The testimony of the defendant's expert, Mr. Tiede, demonstrates
how unsuited courts and lawyers are to deal with technological prob-
lems.
Q. Now, Mr. Cannon asked you about conducting a test to
duplicate the forces here. Is there some reason why you
didn't do that?
A. Yes, sir, there is.
Q. And what is that?
A. There is just no way I could have run a test that would
have been acceptable for anyone here because we didn't
know enough about what angles to be used and speeds
to be used and this kind of thing.Q. You never had the speed of the Mustang, did you?
A. That's right, sir. We would have had to really run a
crash test to do a full car test ....
Id. vol. 2, at 441-42.
46. The omission of any evidence as to the speed of the decedent's auto
was deliberate on the part of plaintiff's counsel. While objecting to
an offer of proof, in camera, he stated: "Your Honor, I don't think
that either the record nor the Pre-Trial Order states one way or an-
other whether she was in fact in motion at the time of this accident."
Id. vol. 2, at 452. Thus the jury was allowed to find that the de-
cedent's car was unreasonably dangerous without any idea of the
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VI. ENHANCED INJURY
The speed of the decedent's automobile was crucial to this case
for another reason. Because Ford was liable only for the extent
to which the decedent's injuries exceded what they would have
been had the door mechanism not been "defective," the speed of
the car was an important element for determining what her in-
juries would have been "but for" the door coming open. It was
readily admitted by the plaintiff's experts that there was no causal
relationship between the alleged defect in the door mechanism and
the occurrence of the impact. Prior to Larsen, this alone would
have been sufficient to deny liability. Larsen changed this, but
it did not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of proving a causal
relationship between her "enhanced injuries" and the alleged de-
fect. No doubt, one of the reasons that auto manufacturers resisted
"second impact" liability so vigorously was that they feared liabil-
ity for the entire amount of damages in any auto accident involv-
ing a noncausal defect.
In Larsen, the Eighth Circuit indicated that this would not be
the case:
Any design defect not causing the accident would not subject the
manufacturer to liability for the entire damage, but the manufac-
turer should be liable for that portion of the damage or injury
caused by the defective design over and above the damage or injury
that probably would have occurred as a result of the impact or col-
lision absent the defective design. The manufacturer argues that
this is difficult to assess. This is no persuasive answer and, even
if difficult, there is no reason to abandon the injured party to his
dismal fate as a traffic statistic, when the manufacturer owed, at
least, a common law duty of reasonable care in the design and con-
struction of its product. The obstacles of apportionment are not
insurmountable. 47
Although, according to Larsen, apportionment is possible, the
burden should be on the plaintiff to produce the evidence upon
which the apportionment can be made. The plaintiff's medical ex-
pert testified that the injuries that caused the decedent's death
occurred after she was thrown from the car. Yet he did not express
any opinion as to what her injuries would have been had the door
remained closed. Here again, evidence of the speed of the dece-
dent's car was crucial. From the evidence, without any expert
testimony for guidance, how could the jury possibly apportion the
plaintiff's damages by any permissible method? 48 The auto-
speed it was traveling at the time of the accident or even if it was
moving.
47. 391 F.2d at 503.
48. The sole evidence as to the relative safety of remaining in the car as
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makers' worst fears expressed in Larsen may have come to fruition
in Melia. Ford Motor Company was held liable for injuries from
an auto accident which was not directly caused by any defect in
its automobile, and with absolutely no evidence from which the
jury could apportion the damages.
The controversy discussed above regarding contributory negli-
gence, misuse of the product and assumption of the risk, might be
alleviated if the Eighth Circuit would give trial courts adequate
guidance for the proper instruction of a jury in an enhanced injury
action. The opportunity was present in Polk v. Ford Motor Co.,4 9
a case preceding Melia by more than three months. Polk involved
a Ford auto which was hit in the rear by a car proceeding in the
same direction at a speed of about 90 to 100 miles per hour. The
plaintiff's auto careened off a retaining wall, overturned, and slid
about 100 feet before coming to rest on its top. The roof supports
collapsed and the car burst into flames. The driver escaped with
severe burns but a passenger was trapped inside and died. The
appellate court, sitting en banc, first held that Missouri law would
allow recovery for enhanced injury. The defendant then chal-
lenged the propriety of the jury instructions, alleging that they
opposed to being thrown out was in the following cryptic exchange
between plaintiff's counsel and his accident expert.Q. My question is, what is the fact, if you get thrown out
of a car, are you better off or not?
A. Well, statistics have shown almost conclusively by studies
performed by the National Safety Council, by the Na-
tional Highway Traffic Safety Administration, over long
periods of time, and based upon injury research and so
forth, that passengers expelled from an automobile have
about a five per cent chance of being killed.
Transcript, vol. 1, at 279, Melia v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV 73-0-121
(D. Neb. 1975). According to this testimony there is a five percent
probability of death occurring to a passenger who is expelled from
an automobile, but there is no indication from this testimony that a
passenger's chances for survival are any better if he remains in the
vehicle. There is nothing in the record (the study was not offered
into evidence) which would indicate that the plaintiff's decedent had
any chance of surviving the impact of the crash even if she had re-
mained in the auto. In fact, the only evidence touching upon the issue
provided by plaintiff's medical expert, Dr. Lewis, points to the oppo-
site conclusion.
To the extent that she was injured as I have described,
those types of injuries are not of the ordinary variety that
would come without a tremendous impact. In other words,
a liver that is split in half, a skull that is fractured to the
great degree that she had, and the injury to her chest and
her ribs and her broken clavicle, I would have to assume that
this happened with a great impact force.
Id. vol. 1, at 197.
49. 529 F.2d 259 (8th Cir. 1976).
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allowed the plaintiffs to recover for all of their damages and not
just for the enhanced injury. The portions of the charge objected
to read:
[TIhere can be no recovery by the plaintiffs unless it appears that
the injuries and damage complained of were proximately caused
or contributed to be caused by the act or acts constituting the de-
fective condition of the automobile.
[M] any factors or things or the conduct of two or more
persons may operate at the same time, either independently or to-
gether, to cause injury or damage, and in such a case, each may
be the proximate cause.50
The court refused to hold that this instruction was erroneous.
While it may have been correct that "a fair reading of the instruc-
tions quoted above is that there may be recovery only for those
injuries which were caused by the defective design,"51 the court
should have required that the jury find specifically what the plain-
tiff's total damages were and what they would have been absent
the defect. The difference then would be the amount for which
the manufacturer would be liable.
This was the course chosen by the Third Circuit in Huddell v.
Levin,52 decided only two weeks after Melia. In this action, the
plaintiff's decedent's auto had run out of gas and was stopped in
the left most lane of a bridge in rush hour traffic. The defendant's
auto ran into the stopped car from the rear at between 50 and 60
miles per hour. The decedent's skull was severely injured and the
plaintiff theorized that the design of the headrest on the car's
driver's seat was defective and thus enhanced the driver's injuries,
The appellate court reversed a jury verdict for the plaintiff,
primarily because "[i] t was not established whether the hypotheti-
cal victim of the survivable crash would have sustained no injuries,
.. . extensive and permanent injuries, or possibly paraplegia or
quadriplegia." 53
The court also found prejudicial error in two of the trial court's
instructions. First, the jury was told that "if there is any substan-
tial possibility that Dr. Huddell would have survived the collision
had the headrest not been defective, assuming you find such a
50. Id. at 267-68 (emphasis in original).
51. Id. at 268.
52. 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976). The idea that the plaintiff must prove
that decedent would have survived the accident "but for" the claimed
defect is hardly a new one. See Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of
Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 YAL.E L.J. 816, 867 (1962).
53. 537 F.2d at 738.
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defect, General Motors would be liable if such defect was a sub-
stantial contributing factor or a proximate cause of Dr. Huddell's
death."54 The instruction was clearly incorrect because:
A plaintiff must prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence,
proof of a "substantial possibility" of survival does not comport
with that affirmative burden. Moreover, this instruction violated
the basic jural conception upon which a crashworthy case is based,
viz., that the automobile manufacturer is liable only for the en-
hanced injuries occasioned by the defectiveness of its product. 55
Second, the trial court erroneously charged the jury "that
the relative severity of the impact is not relevant . . . to your con-
sideration of whether there was a defect in the design of the head-
rest."316 The instruction was incorrect, according to the Third Cir-
cuit, because in a design liability case, "[t] he central issue is: was
the product 'defective'? And this can only be evaluated in the con-
text of a particular risk . . . . In the context of safety equipment,
this means that the manufacturer is not required to design against
extraordinary accidents of unusual circumstance or severity. ' '5 7
In light of the absence of proof on crucial issues, and the
erroneous instructions, the court reversed the verdict for the plain-
tiff and remanded for a new trial. It would have been appropriate
for the Eighth Circuit to have taken similar action in the Melia
appeal. It is regrettable that the court did not take the oppor-
tunity presented in Melia to clarify its earlier holding in Polk and
to lay out definite guidelines for jury instruction in enhanced injury
cases.
VII. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND MISUSE
OF THE PRODUCT
Assuming arguendo, that the door-lock mechanism in Melia was
not reasonably safe as a matter of law, there still remained the
question of what defenses, if any, were available to Ford Motor
Company. Because the trial court refused to admit evidence that
the plaintiff's decedent had run a red light and was driving at 60
miles per hour, the reviewing court was called upon to determine
"whether evidence of contributory negligence is relevant in a
product liability case based on strict liability under Nebraska
law. '5 8  The majority opinion determined that language from
54. Id. at 740.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 534 F.2d at 801.
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Hawkins was dispositive: "It is clear that traditional 'contributory
negligence' in the sense of a failure to discover a defect or to guard
against it, is not a defense to a suit in strict tort, or for breach
of warranty. Assumption of risk and misuse of the product are."5 9
Hawkins must be read in context. It preceded Friedrich and
the adoption of second-impact liability in Nebraska. Thus the
Nebraska Supreme Court really has never discussed the issue of
contributory negligence in a situation in which the "defect" was
not the cause of the accident, but only contributed to the extent
of the resulting injuries. Moreover, a careful reading of the dis-
sents in Kohler, the case initially adopting strict liability in
Nebraska, would indicate that at least three of the judges of the
Nebraska Supreme Court would have been open to the argument
that in some cases the plaintiff's conduct could bar his recovery.
The defenses set out in Hawkins must be read in light of the
historical development of strict products liability. If a manufactur-
er's liability for a defective product were relieved simply because
the injured user failed to discover the defect, the cause of compen-
sating injured victims would have advanced little. It therefore
made sense to eliminate that form of contributory negligence which
consisted of failure to discover or guard against a given defect. Yet
this left the rest of the body of negligence law intact. Because
the concept of proximate cause eliminated liability entirely in those
accidents caused solely by the plaintiff's own negligence, it may
have been appropriate to conclude that the only affirmative de-
fenses still available were assumption of the risk and misuse of the
product. However, Friedrich changed that when it held a manufac-
turer liable for injuries even though no defect in the product had
initially caused the accident. It thus breached the proximate cause
defense that the quote from Hawkins relied upon. Thus Hawkins
was not dispositive of the issue. In fact the opinion specifically
set out misuse of product as a defense.
It is important to distinguish the duties imposed upon defend-
ants by tort law from the defenses available to them. Larsen and
Friedrich expanded the scope of the defendant auto-makers' duty
by requiring them to consider the potentiality of collisions in the
design of their vehicles. However, these cases did not alter the
fact that a plaintiff still has the obligation to exercise due care for
his own protection. The question then becomes: "What forms of
plantiff's conduct will bar his recovery?"
In answering this question, it is important to remember the
policy considerations behind strict liability. The chief purpose of
59. Id. (citing Hawkins, 190 Neb. at 567, 209 N.W.2d at 655).
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strict liability may be risk-spreading. If this were the only purpose,
there would be no reason to deny recovery in any case. The
manufacturers' liability would be absolute and all injured con-
sumers would be compensated. Yet the courts universally have
avowed that this is not their purpose. Liability is imposed only
when the product is "defective." But this is really no limitation at
all in the case of "design defects" because it is usually possible, after
an accident, to develop an engineering theory that would have
minimized injuries if not avoided the mishap entirely. The only
defenses remaining for the auto manufacturers to preclude absolute
liability are the defenses of assumption of the risk and misuse of
the product.
The defense of assumption of the risk is of little use in design
defect cases. It would be rare that the ordinary consumer might
discover and appreciate the danger of a defect which skilled de-
signers and engineers failed to recognize and appreciate. This is
especially true in second-impact cases where the potential for en-
hanced injuries is usually not apparent until after the accident.
The only remaining effective defense for an auto manufacturer
in an enhanced injury design defect case is misuse of the product.
Larsen and its progeny hold that merely being in a collision is not
misuse of an auto per se, because such a happening is readily fore-
seeable. It does not necessarily follow, however, that every car ac-
cident victim should be compensated by the auto manufacturer. If
liability is not to be absolute, there must be some way to distin-
guish those drivers who have misused their autos from those who
have not. This can be done only by admitting all of the evidence
of the circumstances surrounding the accident including the con-
duct of the drivers. The jury, applying some sort of reasonable
person criteria, would be required to determine whether this par-
ticular misuse of the product was so inexcusable as to deny recov-
ery. If such a test had been applied in Melia, the fact that the
plaintiff's decedent had run a red light and was possibly speeding
would have been highly relevant.
VIII. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
Finally, the appellate court held that the trial court properly
refused to instruct the jury on the issue of comparative negligence.
The court indicated that the issue had been decided by the Nebraska
Supreme Court in Hawkins, where it was held that only those forms
of contributory negligence known as "assumption of the risk" and
"misuse of the product" would be available in a strict liability
action. Yet neither Hawkins nor Friedrich dealt with the issue of
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contributory negligence in enhanced injury cases. Particularly in
light of the three dissenting opinions as to the issue of causation
in Kohler, the issue was not a closed matter under Nebraska law.
The majority opinion can be'read as saying that as a matter
of law, the defense of assumption of the risk was unavailable, for it
found that "[c]learly, there is no evidence that the decedent's
alleged conduct of entering an intersection on a red light was in-
tentional rather than inadvertent."6 0  Likewise, it can be argued
that a misuse of product defense is unavailable, in an enhanced
injury auto accident action, because the use of the product, a col-
lision, is foreseeable as a matter of law under Larsen. Yet these
rationales are not supported by the conclusions reached by the trial
judge. At the jury instruction conference, the plaintiff objected
to the giving of instructions on assumption of the risk and misuse
of the product. The trial court overruled these objections, implic-
itly finding that there was some evidence which might justify the
jury in denying liability. If this were the case, that same evidence
would have been relevant to the issue of comparative negligence.
It is inconsistent to say that there is evidence upon which a jury
could find no liability on the part of the defendant based on con-
tributory negligence by the plaintiff's decedent, but that there is
no evidence upon which the jury could find concurring negligence
which might require mediation of damages. Either such evidence
existed, in which case the trial court erred in failing to instruct
on the contributory negligence statute, or it did not exist, in which
case the trial court erred, though not prejudicially, by incorrectly
instructing on the issues of assumption of the risk and misuse of
product. Thus the majority's conclusion that "[i]n view of the
overall status of Nebraska law at this time we cannot say the trial
court reached an interpretation of the law on this issue which is
in conflict with Nebraska law on strict liability,"61 is unsound.
Nor is the court's alternative reasoning persuasive: "We addi-
tionally observe the application of the Nebraska comparative negli-
gence statute would, under the language of the statute, be ex-
60. Id. It is doubtful whether this is a proper conclusion under Nebraska
law. Approximately six months earlier, the Eighth Circuit held, in
Sherrill v. Royal Indus., Inc., 526 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1975) (applying
Nebraska law), that the district court correctly declined to give plain-
tiff's requested instruction "that inadvertence, momentary inattention,
[or] diversion of attention .. . do not constitute assumption of even
the most obvious risk ... [since it was] without merit." Id. at
510 (footnotes omitted). Ironically, the Melia majority cited Sher-
rill on the next page of its opinion for a different proposition, without
any mention of its holding with regard to assumption of the risk.
61. 534 F.2d at 802.
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tremely confusing and inappropriate in a strict liability case." 62
This directly conflicts with the argument in Larsen for the pro-
rating of damages in enhanced injury cases where the court stated
that: "The obstacles of apportionment are not insurmountable. It
is done with regularity in those jurisdictions applying comparative
negligence statutes ....
The court did not explain its conclusion that a concept which
could be handled by juries in 1968 was "extremely confusing and
inappropriate" in 1976. The assertion by the court that "[i] n strict
liability cases proof of negligence or degree of fault is not re-
quired" 64 is a mere conclusion based on circular reasoning. If the
comparative negligence statute is applicable, then clearly degree of
fault becomes a necessary element of the juries' conclusions.
The court's reluctance to apply Nebraska's comparative negli-
gence statute may not have been based upon any theoretical
ground, but rather on a dislike of the precise wording of the stat-
ute chosen by the state's legislature. The court found the statute
"extremely confusing and inappropriate in a strict liability case"
because "[u] nder Nebraska law in order for the comparative negli-
gence statute to be invoked the plaintiff's negligence must be slight
and the defendant's negligence gross in comparison thereto. '65
While the statute may be inartfully drafted, this hardly justifies
a federal court, under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,66 ignoring it.
IX. CONCLUSION
In Melia v. Ford Motor Co. the Eighth Circuit had an oppor-
tunity to issue a landmark decision in the area of design defects
comparable to the precedent established by Larsen v. General
Motors Co. Instead, under the guise of applying state law, it cir-
cumvented Nebraska case law and statute requiring the alloca-
tion of damages between parties when both are responsible for the
injury. The court failed to give any legal criteria for determining
the existence of a design defect. Moreover, the court failed to ask,
or to allow the jury to have the evidence to determine, whether
the policy considerations behind strict liability required its applica-
tion in this instance. Leading commentators agree that the issue
to be resolved in an enhanced injury case is who can best exercise
judgment to avoid the 1oss.67 Ford Motor Company designed the
62. Id.
63. 391 F.2d at 503.
64. 534 F.2d at 802.
65. Id.
66. 304 U.S. 64 (1937).
67. See, e.g., Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test forr Strict Liability in
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best door mechanism consonant with the "state of the art." In fact,
according to one study, it was statistically the safest door of
any cars tested. On the other hand, the plaintiff's decedent failed
to lock her door, failed to wear her seat belt, and failed to stop
for a red light. Thus Ford Motor Company was held liable for
a conscious design choice it made more than five years6s prior to
the accident and no part of the liability was assessed to the dece-
dent who had three obvious opportunities to avoid the injury, which
required little effort or foresight. Moreover, the plaintiff failed
to introduce any evidence from which the jury could apportion the
damages or even conclude that the alleged defect enhanced the
decedent's injuries.
The prime justification for such a holding would appear to be
loss distribution.6 9 Yet there is a limit to how much loss distribu-
tion a society is willing and able to afford. What is required is
a balancing of the cost of insurance versus the safety obtained and
the responsibility of the individual for his own acts. The unenthu-
siastic response of state legislatures and the electorate to "no-fault"
insurance indicates that there are limits to how much the public
is willing to pay for complete protection from all risk of harm.
The First Circuit recently stated that it is important to keep
the overall societal purpose and impact of strict liability in mind
in each case: "Product liability in the individual case is paid for
by the manufacturer, or its insurer, but in the long run whatever
standard has to be met is reflected in the cost of the product. '70
Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1061 (1972); Holford, The Limits of Strict
Liability for Product Design and Manufacture, 52 TEX. L. REV. 81, 90
(1973).
68. A number of commentators have advanced the concept of "negligence
with hind sight" as a way of evaluating a manufacturer's product. In
other words, would a reasonable manufacturer, with all of the knowl-
edge available at the time of trial, still put the product on the market?
See Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the
Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559, 568
(1969); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44
Miss. L.J. 825, 839 (1973); Comment, Elimination of "Unreasonably
Dangerous" from § 402A-The Price of Consumer Safety? 14: DuQ. L.
Ra,. 25, 44 (1975). There is no evidence that the Nebraska Supreme
Court would adopt such a view.
69. Professor William Prosser dismissed loss distribution as a make-
weight argument in Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability
to the Consumer), 50 MiNN. L. Rzv. 791, 800 (1966). Most writers
tend to justify strict liability in terms of enterprise liability and risk
spreading. See, e.g., Comment, Continuing the Common Law Re-
sponse to the New Industrial State: The Extension of Enterprise Lia-
bility To Consumer Services, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 401, 447 (1974).
70. Mitchell v. Ford Motor Co., 533 F.2d 19, 21 (1st Cir. 1976). Products
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The majority in Melia again parrotted the language that strict
liability "was not intended to make the manufacturer an insurer
of the safety of the automobile's occupants under all circum-
stances."'' 1 However, the court failed to articulate any workable
standard that prevents the defendant's liability from being absolute.
The dissenting conclusion of Judge Bright bears repeating:
This case virtually makes the manufacturer the insurer of the safety
of the occupants of an automobile and would impose a duty upon
the automobile manufacturer to construct an automobile in such a
way as to avoid injury to the occupants under almost any possible
impact situation. To cast such a burden upon the manufacturer of
an automobile is impractical and uneconomic.
No doubt the manufacturers of automobiles could design and
build an automobile with the strength and crash-damage resistance
features of an M-2 army tank. I believe the average and reason-
able automobile user desires only a reasonably safe, economical
form of motor transportation. No greater burden of design-per-
formance ought to be imposed upon automobile manufacturers by
either judge or jury.72
Terry R. Wittler '77
liability litigation is effecting the cost of products and insurance. As
in the medical malpractice area, sky rocketing premiums are inducing
a number of manufacturers to "go bare." See Wall St. J., Oct. 27,
1976, at 4, col. 1. Others, particularly smaller manufacturers, are being
forced out of business because their products liability insurance has
been canceled or they have had to satisfy huge personal injury judg-
ments. See Wall St. J., June 3, 1976, at 1, col. 5.
71. 534 F.2d at 797.
72. Id. at 803.
